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CIA V. SIMS: SUPREME COURT DEFERENCE TO
AGENCY INTERPRETATION OF FOIA
EXEMPTION 3
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)' has given rise to differences
between Congress and the Supreme Court over the scope of the Act's statu-
tory exemptions2 and the standard of judicial review.3 Enacted in 1966,' the
FOIA was intended to provide the public with broad access to the pursuits
and policies of the national government.5 In passing the FOIA, however,
Congress recognized that certain information would have to remain pro-
tected from the public view.6 Accordingly, it incorporated nine exemptions7
into the statute that agencies could invoke in denying release of particular
categories of information.8 This initial version of the FOIA was seen as an
improvement9 over the previous section of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) relating to public access to government information.'O However,
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. I 1983).
2. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
3. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
4. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
5. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON AD-
MINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SEN-
ATE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES,
ARTICLES 38 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as FOIA SOURCE BOOK]. For an analysis
of the FOIA, see Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEO.
L.J. 18 (1967). See also Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 761 (1967).
6. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 5, at 38.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). The exemptions include: (1) national secur-
ity matters classified pursuant to an executive order; (2) agency personnel rules and practices;
(3) preexisting nondisclosure statutes; (4) commercial secrets; (5) internal government memo-
randa or letters; (6) personal privacy matters; (7) investigatory records used in law enforce-
ment; (8) financial regulation reports; and (9) certain matters relating to wells. This Note will
be concerned with exemptions I and 3 only.
8. The exemptions are viewed as being a matter of discretion. Agencies are not required
to invoke any of them in response to a FOIA request. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 293 (1979) ("We simply hold here that Congress did not design the FOIA exemptions to
be mandatory bars to disclosure").
9. See, e.g., 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.3 (2d ed. 1978). See also
Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 150
(1969).
10. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3(a), 60 Stat. 237-38.
As originally written, the APA's public disclosure section dictated that "matters of official
record shall in accordance with published rules be made available to persons properly and
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congressional dissatisfaction with the restrictive manner in which agencies
implemented the FOIA" and the courts interpreted it' 2 resulted in substan-
tial revisions in 1974'1 and 1976.14 The amendments were intended to pro-
vide the courts with increased authority to review agency decisions
withholding information pursuant to the Act's statutory exemptions.
15
One of the catalysts for congressional action in 1974 was the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in EPA v. Mink. 16 In Mink, the Court
deferred to the executive branch and construed the FOIA's national security
directly concerned except information held confidential for good cause found." The Senate
report on the FOIA had criticized this section as being "of little or no value to the public in
gaining access to records of the federal government." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 40. The report went on to claim
that the provision's impact had been the opposite, i.e., it was used as the basis to justify the
nondisclosure of government information sought by the public. Id. The FOIA substantially
revised § 3(a) of the APA. For background material on the Administrative Procedure Act as
amended by the FOIA and the Government in the Sunshine Act, see ADMINISTRATIVE CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK
545-668 (Office of the Chairman 1985).
11. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-42 (1972) reprinted in COMM.
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMM. ON Gov-
ERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SEN-
ATE, SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (PUB. L. No. 93-502) SOURCE BOOK: LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 27-49 (Jt. Comm. Print 1975) [herein-
after cited as JOINT SOURCE BOOK] (discussing the administrative roadblocks preventing
effective implementation of the FOIA from 1967-72).
12. See Comment, The 1966 Freedom of Information Act: Early Judicial Interpretations,
44 WASH. L. REV. 641, 645 (1969) (arguing that early court constructions of the statute did
not reflect congressional intent).
13. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(B),
552(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)). See Congressional Research Service, The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act Amendments of 1974. A History of the Legislative Proceedings, reprinted in JOINT
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 109-16. See also infra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
14. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552b, 552(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. I 1983)). See, e.g., COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, U.S. SENATE AND THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE AcT-S. 5 (PUB. L.
No. 94-409) SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 1-7
(Jt. Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as SUNSHINE ACT SOURCE BOOK] (describing the
legislative history of the amendments to the APA); Note, The Effect of the 1976 Amendment to
Exemption Three of the Freedom of Information Act, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1041-44 (1976)
(reviewing the legislative history of that portion of the Government in the Sunshine Act relat-
ing to the FOIA). See also infra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1974), reprinted in JOINT
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 225-26 (endorsing active judicial review under the FOIA and
permitting in camera inspection of agency documents for which an exemption has been
invoked).
16. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See infra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
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exemption (exemption 1) broadly in favor of nondisclosure.17 Similarly, one
of the primary reasons for the 1976 amendments 8 to the Act was the
Court's interpretation of the statutory exemption (exemption 3) in Adminis-
trator, FAA v. Robertson. 19 In Robertson, the Court again deferred to an
agency position that favored nondisclosure. 20
Despite such congressional actions to overrule the Court and strengthen
the role of judicial review in the FOIA process,2 the Supreme Court re-
cently rendered an opinion strongly reminiscent of its earlier decisions in
Mink and Robertson. CIA v. Sims22 involved judicial interpretation of the
scope of exemption 3 as amended in 1976.23 Specifically, it concerned
whether section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947,24 which au-
thorizes the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, qualified as
an exemption 3 statute.25 Additionally, the Court considered whether the
individuals and institutions that provided certain information to the agency
were "intelligence sources" within the meaning of the National Security Act
for purposes of the FOIA exemption.2 6 The Court accepted the arguments
advanced by the CIA and held that the exemption was properly invoked.
2 7
It also ruled that the material sought by Sims was protected from release
because it related to intelligence sources.28
Sims had filed a FOIA request with the CIA for the grant proposals, con-
tracts, and identities of institutions and researchers involved in the MKUL-
TRA project. 29 The existence of MKULTRA, a CIA-sponsored project that
17. 410 U.S. at 84.
18. See H.R. REP. No. 880, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 22-23 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2183, 2204-05.
19. 422 U.S. 255 (1975). See infra notes 129-33, 142-46, and accompanying text.
20. 422 U.S. at 266-67.
21. See infra notes 115, 133, and accompanying text.
22. 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985).
23. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983); see also infra note 146 and accompa-
nying text.
24. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
25. 105 S. Ct. at 1884. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. See also infra note 146
and accompanying text.
26. 105 S. Ct. at 1884. This Note will be concerned primarily with the question of
whether the individuals involved in a certain research program were "intelligence sources" and
their names thus exempt from release under the FOIA. It will not deal with the cross-petition
filed by Sims relating to whether the CIA was required by the FOIA to release the institutional
affiliations of those researchers whose names were exempt from disclosure as "intelligence
sources." Id. at 1892-94.
27. Id. at 1890.
28. Id. at 1892.
29. Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also Brief for Respondents at 5-
11, CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985) (discussing the facts of the case). Sims was joined in
1985]
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dealt with various aspects of psychological and brainwashing techniques, be-
came known during congressional investigations in the mid-1970's. 31 In re-
sponse to Sims' request, the agency released information relating to the grant
proposals, contracts, and some of the institutions,3 1 but refused to reveal the
identities of the researchers who participated.3 2 One of the reasons cited for
the CIA's action was FOIA exemption 3.33
Sims then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia to force the release of the names withheld.34 The district court
ordered disclosure of those individuals and institutions that it concluded
were not "intelligence sources" under the National Security Act.35  The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, an-
nouncing a new definition of "intelligence sources,"'36 remanded the case for
reconsideration.3 7 Applying the court of appeals' definition, the district
court ordered the release of the names of some of the researchers and institu-
the FOIA request and subsequent lawsuit by Sidney Wolfe, M.D., but for purposes of this
Note, Sims alone will be cited as plaintiff/respondent.
30. See generally Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavorial Modi-
fication: Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence and the Subcomm. on Health
and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977). Originally it was believed that all of the records regarding the project had been de-
stroyed, but subsequent to the investigation by a Senate select committee of abuses in the
intelligence community, the CIA discovered the existence of the administrative records that
became the subject of Sims' FOIA request. See also FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM.
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S.
REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 385-422, 471-72 (1976) (discussing the information avail-
able to Congress prior to the discovery of the administrative materials by the CIA).
31. Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 84-85 (D.D.C. 1979). The agency made an effort to contact
all of the institutions involved and disclosed the names of those that did not object. It did not
make a parallel effort to contact the individual researchers who had taken part in the program.
See 105 S. Ct. at 1885 n.7, 1893 n.22.
32. 479 F. Supp. at 85.
33. Id. The CIA also cited the privacy exemption (exemption 6) as a reason for refusing
to disclose the identity of the researchers. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). By
the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the agency had abandoned its privacy claim in
favor of exclusive reliance upon its exemption 3 arguments. 105 S. Ct. at 1885 n.6. The CIA
declined to invoke the national security exemption (exemption 1) in denying release of the
material. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). In his concurring opinion in Sims, Justice Marshall criti-
cized the agency and the Court for ignoring the relevancy of exemption 1 to the documents at
issue. 105 S. Ct. at 1895, 1897-98 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). See also infra notes
46, 169-73, and accompanying text.
34. 479 F. Supp. at 84.
35. Id. at 87-88.
36. 642 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court of appeals defined an "intelligence source"
as a "person or institution that provides, has provided, or has been engaged to provide the CIA
with information of a kind the Agency needs to perform its intelligence function effectively, yet
could not reasonably expect to obtain without guaranteeing the confidentiality of those who
provide it." Id. at 571.
37. Id. at 563.
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tions, 38 but declined to do so for those who had requested and been prom-
ised confidentiality by the CIA and those whose other work for the agency
might reveal sensitive foreign intelligence operations.39 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit reversed that part of the lower court's opinion relating to the "need-
for-confidentiality" portion of its definition.' The court of appeals rejected
the view that an individual's request for confidentiality was sufficient to sat-
isfy its formulation of "intelligence source."'" Judge Bork dissented from
this aspect of the court's decision.42
The United States Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the definition
of "intelligence source" formulated by the court of appeals was unsatisfac-
tory.43 Further, seven of the justices sided with Judge Bork's view that the
National Security Act afforded the Director of the CIA wide discretion to
protect sources without regard to the need for secrecy." Justices Marshall
and Brennan, however, argued that such a broad reading of the statute could
not be supported by its language or legislative history.4 5 In a concurrence
that reads more like a dissent, Justice Marshall attacked the Court for ignor-
ing the more rigorous judicial review required by the national security ex-
emption,46 and for wreaking havoc with the overall congressional scheme
38. 2 Gov't Discl. Serv. (P-H) 82,087 (D.D.C. 1981).
39. Id.
40. 709 F.2d 95, 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
41. Id. at 99. The court of appeals was also concerned that automatically permitting the
agency to invoke exemption 3 to prevent disclosure of the identities of particular informants
because they requested confidentiality might result in "collusion" between the CIA and the
source. Id. at 99 n.7.
42. Id. at 101 (Bork, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Bork argued
that a promise of secrecy to an informant should be enough to qualify him as an "intelligence
source" and thus protect his identity. Otherwise, sources would be hesitant in the future to
cooperate with U.S. intelligence agencies. Id. at 102. Judge Bork also took issue with the
court's formulation of "intelligence source" and suggested that the broad language of
§ 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act did not mean that the agency could protect sources
only if secrecy was required in order to obtain the information. Id. at 103. He concluded that
the statute "authorizes the nondisclosure of a source of information whenever disclosure might
lead to discovery of what subjects were of interest to the CIA." Id. The Supreme Court
majority in Sims reacted favorably to his arguments. 105 S. Ct. at 1886 n.8, 1892.
43. 105 S. Ct. at 1890-91, 1894.
44. Id. at 1890, 1892. See supra note 42.
45. Id. at 1894 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
46. Id. at 1895-96. Both the district court and the court of appeals had discussed the
availability of the national security exemption in protecting "intelligence sources," but the
agency declined to invoke it. See 479 F. Supp. at 88 ("Nothing in the Court's ruling . . . is
intended to foreclose . . . new classification of the lists and resort to section (b)(1) in order to
protect any commitment to anonymity made by [the CIA] to any institution or researchers").
See also Sims, 709 F.2d at 99 ("[I]f revelation of the identity of a source of information would
in any way impair national security, the agency can easily justify withholding his name by
invoking exemption 1 of the Act").
1985]
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giving the judiciary an active role in limiting the discretion of agencies to
deny the release of government information requested under the FOIA.47
This Note will examine Mink4" and Robertson,49 two early interpretations
of the FOIA by the Supreme Court. In these cases, the Court followed a
policy of deference to agency interpretations of exemptions 1 and 3. It will
then analyze the congressional reaction to these decisions and discuss briefly
the legislative histories of the FOIA amendments enacted in 197450 and
1976.51 The Note will then examine the Court's majority
5 2 and concurring 53
opinions in Sims in light of congressional efforts to strengthen the hand of
the judiciary in reviewing agency decisions to withhold information under
exemptions 1 and 3. This section will focus upon the definition of "intelli-
gence sources" that is most in conformance with the legislative histories of
the National Security Act of 1947 and the FOIA.5 4 The Note will conclude
that the Court's decision in Sims is akin to those handed down in Mink and
Robertson in its deference to an agency's interpretation of a FOIA exemp-
tion, and in its apparent reluctance to rely upon (1) congressional intent as
reflected in the FOIA's legislative history and (2) previous congressional ex-
pressions of disenchantment with judicial deference.55 In adopting a broad
definition of "intelligence sources," the Court has weakened the role of the
judiciary in the FOIA process, and in so doing diminished the ability of the
public to gain access to government information.
I. EARLY JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FOIA BY THE SUPREME
COURT: CONGRESS CLARIFIES THE SCOPE OF THE
EXEMPTIONS AND THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW UNDER THE ACT
A. Legislative History of FOIA
The enactment of the FOIA, 56 which followed a decade-long effort to
47. 105 S. Ct. at 1895-96 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
48. See supra note 16; see also infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 19; see also infra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 129-33, 142-46, and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 154-67 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 168-84 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 185-205 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 113-15, 133, and accompanying text.
56. In the first session of the 89th Congress, the Senate approved S. 1160. S. 1160, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REC. 26,821 (1965). S. 1160 was substantially similar to the bill
the Senate had passed in the preceding Congress. See S. 1666, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). A
revised version of S. 1666 won Senate endorsement on July 28, 1964. S. 1666, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 17,089 (1964). See S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964),
reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 86 (discussing the provisions and purpose of
[Vol. 35:279
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amend the public access section of the APA,5 7 was a first step into the sun-
shine. It provided the public with a judicially enforceable right of access to
information generated by the federal government.58 Although the drafters
were cognizant that certain areas would need to be outside the scope of the
Act,59 the presumption was in favor of disclosure wherever possible," with
the judiciary serving as guardian of the public's statutory right to know.61
Despite House adoption of the Senate version of the FOIA (S. 1160),62
significant differences between the Senate and House reports accompanying
S. 1666). Although the House failed to act upon the Senate's previous proposal, it did embrace
S. 1160 in the second session of the 89th Congress. 112 CONG. REC. 13,661 (1966). President
Johnson signed the measure on July 4, 1966. See 2 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 895-96 (Jul.
11, 1966) (statement of the President upon signing the FOIA). The Act became effective one
year later. It was codified by Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967).
57. See FOIA SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 6-9 (discussing the statute's legislative his-
tory). See also 112 CONG. REC. 13,659-60 (1966) (statement of Rep. Dwyer), reprinted in
FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 83.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3, 8 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 38, 43. See also DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
CASE LIST 265 (Sept. 1985). The section entitled A Short Guide to the Freedom of Information
Act provides useful information on the FOIA's procedural requirements, each of the nine ex-
emptions, and various litigation considerations. Id. at 265-365. The Office of Information and
Privacy also publishes a quarterly newsletter that describes developments in the area of public
access to government information. See, e.g., VI DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FOIA UPDATE 1-
2 (Winter 1985) (discussing the protection of national security information under FOIA ex-
emption 1).
59. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983); see also supra note 7. The Senate report
that accompanied passage of the FOIA stated:
At the same time that a broad philosophy of "freedom of information" is enacted
into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally important rights of privacy with
respect to certain information in Government files, such as medical and personnel
records. It is also necessary for the very operation of our Government to allow it to
keep confidential certain material, such as the investigatory files of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation.
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note
5, at 38.
60. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 5, at 38, which stated: "Success lies in providing a workable formula which
encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible
disclosure." Id. (emphasis added). See also 112 CONG. REC. 13,654 (1966) (statement of Rep.
Rumsfeld) ("This bill is not to be considered ... a withholding statute in any sense of the
term. . . . It is our intent that the courts interpret this legislation broadly, as a disclosure
statute and not as an excuse to withhold information from the public."), reprinted in FOIA
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 71-72.
61. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 5, at 43. See also 120 CONG. REC. 17,021 (1974) (statement of Sen. Cran-
ston), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 301.
62. See supra note 56.
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the proposal made difficult a clear understanding of legislative intent.6 3
Commentators were quick to point out these discrepancies, 64 and the com-
mittee which drafted the House report was severely criticized for its ac-
tion. While the Senate report generally followed the proposal's language
and reflected a view supporting a broad construction of the statute,66 the
House report took a decidedly more restrictive approach.6 7 The uncertainty
of legislative intent led to confusion in the courts.68 At the time, it was
argued that the House had attempted to rewrite the provisions of the FOIA
in a committee report. 69 Although the House declined to amend the lan-
guage of S. 1160 or take issue with the legislative intent as expressed in the
Senate report, the House sought to alter the entire thrust of the proposal in a
committee report rather than on the chamber floor.7 1 Compounding the dif-
ficulty for the courts was the fact that the memorandum prepared by the
Attorney General,7 1 concerning agency implementation of the FOIA, gener-
ally adopted the positions contained in the House report. 72
In addition to the significant differences between the Senate and House
63. See Davis, supra note 5, at 763, 809-10 & nn. 130-31. See also K. DAVIS, supra note 9,
at § 5.3.
64. Davis, supra note 5, at 763. See also Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and
Seek under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1261, 1265-66 (1970) (endorsing
the views expressed in the Davis article).
65. See Davis, supra note 5, at 809-10. Professor Davis wrote:
I believe (a) that statements in a House committee report that contradict the bill and
depart from the understanding of the Senate committee are not the law, and (b) that
inserting such statements into a committee report, instead of changing the bill, is a
clear abuse. . . . The content of the law must depend upon the intent of both
Houses, not of just one. In this instance, only the bill, not the House committee's
statements at variance with the bill, reflects the intent of both Houses. Indeed, no
one will ever know whether the Senate committee or the Senate would have concurred
in the restrictions written into the House committee report.
Id. (emphasis in original).
66. Id. at 763. See also K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at § 5.3.
67. See Davis, supra note 5, at 763.
68. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1968) (arguing for a
narrow construction of the FOIA, including a restrictive interpretation of who was able to
request government information under the Act); Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal.
1969) (holding that Congress did not intend to grant courts the right of de novo review for
information withheld pursuant to one of the Act's statutory exemptions). See generally Com-
ment, supra note 12 (discussing in detail Bristol-Myers, Epstein, and other early district court
cases construing the FOIA).
69. See Davis, supra note 5, at 809.
70. Id. at 809-10.
71. Att'y Gen. Memo. on the Public Information Section of the APA (1967), reprinted in
FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 194.
72. See Davis, supra note 5, at 763.
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reports, the FOIA itself was criticized for being inartfully drafted.73 As a
result, early court interpretations of the statute took varying approaches in
construing the Act's ambiguous language.74 In the 1974 and 1976 amend-
ments, however, Congress intended to resolve the ambiguities in favor of a
broad construction of the disclosure provisions.75 Any indication that the
original House report reflected legislative intent accurately should have been
dispelled by these subsequent congressional actions to strengthen the judicial
review section of the Act and to amend the language of exemptions I and 3.
The Court in Sims, however, chose to disregard these clarifications of legisla-
tive intent.
B. The Supreme Court Interprets the FOIA
Given the ambiguities in the original Act, the confusion regarding its leg-
islative history, and the restrictive interpretation adopted by the Attorney
General, the courts often took a deferential attitude whenever any agency
invoked one of the nine exemptions.76 This deferential approach was reen-
forced by two decisions of the United States Supreme Court in 1973 and
1975. In the first case, Mink v. EPA, 7 7 the Court was asked to construe
exemption 1, the national security exemption. 78 In Mink, members of Con-
gress sued to obtain executive branch documents relating to a scheduled un-
derground nuclear test.79 The action was filed after the executive branch
refused to disclose the documents, citing exemption 1 as the basis for its
73. Id. at 761. See also Koch, The Freedom of Information Act.: Suggestions for Making
Information Available to the Public, 32 MD. L. REV. 189, 195 n.26 (1972).
74. See generally Comment, supra note 12.
75. See infra notes 112-46 and accompanying text. See also S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 158; H.R. REP. No. 880,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 22-23 (1976), reprinted in SUNSHINE ACT SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 14, at 533-34.
76. See supra note 68.
77. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). The Court was also asked to construe the inter/intra-agency
exemption (exemption 5). In contrast to the Court's ruling that judges could not review classi-
fied documents in camera to assess the validity of an agency's exemption 1 claim, the Court
held that lower courts could review items to determine whether an agency's exemption 5 claim
was proper. Id. at 93. In so doing the lower courts could segregate the deliberative portions of
a memorandum from the purely factual matters, and order the release of the latter. Id. at 91-
94. However, agencies first should be permitted to show the appropriateness of withholding
the items by affidavit before in camera review by the court is required. Id. at 93-94. The
dissenting justices criticized the majority for treating exemptions I and 5 differently for pur-
poses of judicial review. Id. at 96 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Id.
at 109-10 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 74. At the time Mink was decided, exemption I permitted nondisclosure of
matters that were "specifically required by executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
79. 410 U.S. at 75. See generally Mink, The Mink Case: Restoring the Freedom of Infor-
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decision."0 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted summary judgment in favor of the government s.8  The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that
the national security exemption permitted the agency to withhold only the
portions of the documents actually classified. 2 The court of appeals di-
rected the district court to review the classified items to determine whether
portions of them could be released. 3
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision.8 4 It construed
exemption 1 in favor of the executive branch and held that the exemption
could not be used to compel the release of documents.8 5 In addition, the
Court expressed the view that the Act did not permit in camera examination
of such documents to determine whether unclassified segments could be dis-
closed.86 Under the Court's interpretation, once the government demon-
strated that the specific items were entitled to the exemption's protection, the
judiciary's role was at an end.87 Writing for the majority, Justice White
rejected the view that the courts should second guess a classification decision
made by the executive branch. 8
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Douglas dissented from the Court's con-
struction of exemption 1.9 They disagreed with the majority's view that the
FOIA's legislative history supported the position that exemption 1 should be
treated differently from the other exemptions for purposes of court review.90
The three justices agreed that the Act directed the courts to review matters
de novo,9 with the burden on the agency to sustain its arguments in favor of
mation Act, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 8 (1974) (providing a contemporaneous account of the
facts of the case by the leading congressional litigant).
80. 410 U.S. at 75.
81. Id. at 78.
82. 464 F.2d 742, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
83. Id. at 746. The court of appeals directed the district court to examine the items in
camera to determine whether any portions of them could be released. The court of appeals
also noted that particular care must be taken in the review process because the documents
concerned nuclear testing. Id. at 746-47.
84. 410 U.S. at 78, 94.
85. Id. at 81.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 84.
88. Id. Justice White's reading of the legislative history of the FOIA made "wholly un-
tenable any claim that the Act intended to subject the soundness of executive security classifi-
cations to judicial review at the insistence of any objecting citizen." Id.
89. Id. at 95 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Id. at 105 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 96, 102-10.
91. Id. at 96, 106. Justice Douglas argued that issuance of a new executive order by the
President during the pendency of the case supported the appellate court's remand to the dis-




Two years later, in Administrator, FAA v. Robertson,93 the Court again
took a deferential approach in construing a FOIA exemption. The issue in
Robertson was whether section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 195894
qualified as a nondisclosure statute for purposes of exemption 3.95 Copies of
FAA reports analyzing the operation and maintenance performance of com-
mercial airlines had been requested.96 The agency refused to release the
items because the FAA's enabling statute gave the FAA Administrator dis-
cretionary authority not to disclose information if he determined that disclo-
sure was not in the public interest.97
comply with the appellate court's order, the district court would have had to examine the
items in camera. The executive order-Exec. Order No. 11,652-contained a section directing
agencies to mark documents to indicate which parts or paragraphs were classified and at what
level. This practice is known as "portion marking." Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 1085
(1971-75 Comp.) There have been two executive orders on classification since the Mink deci-
sion. Both have retained the portion marking requirement. See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3
C.F.R. 190 (1979); Exec. Order. No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983).
92. 410 U.S. at 96 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Id. at 109-10
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
94. 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970), provided, in pertinent part:
Any person may make written objection to the public disclosure of information con-
tained in any . . . document filed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter or of
information obtained by the. . . [FAA] Administrator,. . . stating the grounds for
such objection. Whenever such objection is made, the. . . Administrator shall order
such information withheld from public disclosure when, in [his] judgment, a disclo-
sure. . . would adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the
interest of the public.
Section 1504 has since been amended to eliminate the authority of the FAA Administrator to
withhold information. Such authority has been transferred to the Secretaries of State or Trans-
portation. In addition, the vague public interest standard has been replaced. Information can
currently be withheld only "if disclosure ... would prejudice the formulation and presenta-
tion of positions of the United States in international negotiations or adversely affect the com-
petitive position of any air carrier in foreign air transportation." See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1504
(1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
95. 422 U.S. at 256-57. At the time of the Robertson decision, the FOIA permitted an
agency to withhold matters that were "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970). The Robertson majority stressed that the language of exemption 3
was not changed in 1974 when Congress made extensive revisions in the FOIA. 422 U.S. at
256 n.2, 267. The FAA also justified denial of the release of the information on the basis of
exemptions 4 (business information), 5 (intra-agency memorandums), and 7 (investigatory
files). 422 U.S. at 259.
96. The documents at issue were Systems Worthiness Analysis Program (SWAP) reports.
They were prepared by the FAA. Id. at 257-59. For further discussion of the nature of these
reports, see Note, Freedom of Information-Exemption Three-SWAP Reports are Specifically
Exempt from Disclosure by Statute Because FAA Administrator Issued a Withholding Order
Pursuant to Discretionary Authority, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 367-68 (1975).
97. 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970). See also 422 U.S. at 259-60.
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In the subsequent suit, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia ruled against the government.9" The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed that portion of the lower
court's opinion which held that section 1104 was not within the scope of
exemption 3.99 The court of appeals concluded that the statute relied on by
the FAA permitted the agency too much discretion for it to meet the
FOIA's exemption requirements. 1°°
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision.10 Speaking
for the Court, Chief Justice Burger, who would later write the opinion in
Sims, concluded that the legislative history of the FOIA and the 1974
amendments did not demonstrate that Congress intended to "repeal by im-
plication"1°2 all nondisclosure statutes in existence before the FOIA was en-
acted.'1 3 In reaching this conclusion, the Chief Justice noted that because
the exemption's language was ambiguous," °4 the courts of appeals had given
it varying interpretations.'0 5 He then focused on the restrictive House re-
port, which stated that FOIA exemption 3 would not modify the approxi-
mately 100 statutes already in effect that restricted public access to
particular government documents.'0 6 He cited the House report to justify
the Court's acceptance of the FAA's arguments. The Chief Justice also sug-
gested that the deferential position outlined in the House report remained in
effect because Congress did not amend the exemption's language in 1974
when it made extensive changes to the Act.' 7 He did not view as inconsis-
tent the broad disclosure mandate of the FOIA and the need for the FAA to
98. Robertson v. Butterfield, No. 71-1970 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 1972).
99. Robertson v. Butterfield, 498 F.2d 1031, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court of appeals
remanded the case for examination in light of other FOIA exemptions the FAA might decide
to raise. Id.
100. Id.
101. 422 U.S. at 267.
102. Id. at 265-66. In analyzing the legislative history of exemption 3, the Chief Justice
relied almost exclusively on the restrictive House report that accompanied passage of the origi-
nal FOIA. Id. at 265. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
differences between the Senate and House reports on the FOIA and the criticism engendered
by the latter. See also Note, supra note 14, at 1036-41 (taking issue with the Robertson Court's
reading of the legislative history relating to exemption 3).
103. 422 U.S. at 264-65, 267.
104. Id. at 263.
105. Id. at 262 n.6 (citing a number of cases in which courts of appeals have construed
exemption 3 differently).
106. Id. at 265 (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966)) ("There
are nearly 100 statutes or parts of statutes which restrict public access to specific Government
records. These would not be modified by the public records provision of S. 1160."). The
Senate report contained no such language. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965),
reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 44.
107. 422 U.S. at 267.
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be permitted wide latitude in protecting certain of its information in the
"public interest."1 °8
Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented in Robertson."°9 They agreed
with the position of the court of appeals that the discretionary nature of
section 1104 and its vague public interest standard were insufficient for it to
qualify as a "specific exemption by statute" within the meaning of exemption
3 of the FOIA. "O The dissenters agreed with the court of appeals' view that
the legislative history of the Act supported a narrow construction of the
exemption. 1 "
C. Congress Reacts to the Nondisclosure Bent of the Supreme Court
1. The 1974 Amendments
Both the Mink and Robertson decisions precipitated legislative action to
strengthen the FOIA. "2 Although Congress had already expressed dissatis-
faction with agency implementation of the Act," 13 it was not until the
Supreme Court's first interpretation of the Act's provisions in Mink that
Congress took action." 4 The primary effect of the Mink decision was to
prompt Congress to amend exemption I and those sections of the statute
108. Id. at 265-66.
109. Id. at 268 (Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
110. Id. See Robertson, 498 F.2d at 1036. The court of appeals argued that the FOIA was
the controlling statute as to what constituted the public interest regarding information policy,
and therefore took precedence over the previously enacted § 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act.
Id. at 1035-36.
111. 422 U.S. at 268-69. See Robertson, 498 F.2d at 1032.
112. See infra notes 115-25, 133, 142-46, and accompanying text.
113. Congressional oversight of the administration and implementation of the FOIA was
the responsibility of the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Subcommittee on Adminis-
trative Practice and Procedure. The House subcommittee held the first extensive hearings on
implementation of the Act in March 1972. See U.S. Government Information Policies and
Practices: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess
(1972) (parts 4-6 of the nine volume set deal with the FOIA's public access provisions). As a
result of the hearings, the committee made a number of specific findings. It determined that
some agency regulations were unacceptable because they failed to adhere to congressional in-
tent. The committee also concluded that agencies were charging excessive fees for search and
reproduction costs and that the statutory exemptions were being "misused" by the agencies in
an effort to block the release of government information. See H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 8-11 (1972), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 15-18 (outlining the
committee's finding and conclusions).
114. Although Congress continued to hold hearings on the FOIA after the findings made
by the House Committee on Government Operations and considered proposals to amend the
Act, the proposals did not come to fruition until after the Supreme Court's decision in Mink.
See Mink, supra note 79, at 13.
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dealing with the nature of judicial review.' 15
During extensive congressional hearings,1 16 considerable debate occurred
over both exemption 1 and the judicial review provisions. "17 Proponents of a
heightened role for the judiciary in reviewing exemption 1 claims argued
that the Mink decision had to be overturned. 18 While Congress declined to
mandate in camera inspections of documents sought to be withheld under
exemption 1,1 " it also refused to require judges to uphold agency decisions
based on the national security exemption if the agency merely had a "reason-
able basis" for its decision.12° The administration argued forcefully for the
reasonable basis language.121 It asserted that any other language would in-
fringe on the President's constitutional powers as commander of the armed
115. See S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-17, 28-31 (1974), reprinted in JOINT
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 165-67, 180-83. Regarding de novo review of classified docu-
ments under the FOIA, the Senate report stated:
It is essential . . . to the proper workings of [the Act] that any executive branch
review, itself, be reviewable outside the executive branch. And the courts-when
necessary, using special masters or expert consultants of their own choosing. . . are
the only forums now available in which such review can properly be conducted.
S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1974), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note
11, at 183.
116. See, e.g., The Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Congressional Research Service, supra note
13, at 109.
117. See 120 CONG. REC. 6803-20 (House debate of Mar. 14, 1974); 120 CONG. REC.
17,014-47 (Senate debate of May 30, 1974); 120 CONG. REC. 33,157-59 (Senate action on con-
ference report, Oct. 1, 1974); 120 CONG. REc. 34,161-69 (House debate and action on confer-
ence report, Oct. 7, 1974).
118. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 6812-13 (1974) (statement of Rep. Mink criticizing the
Supreme Court's decision and asking for support of amendments to the FOIA that would
overrule "this ridiculous court interpretation"), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note
11, at 258-61.
119. See 120 CONG. REC. 17,019 (1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy indicating that the
courts will have the discretion to examine disputed classified documents in camera), reprinted
in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 294.
120. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,869-70 (1974) (statement of Sen. Muskie supporting efforts to
override President Ford's veto and taking issue with the administration's position in favor of a
"reasonable basis" standard of review), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at
447-49.
121. See Letter from President Ford to Sen. Kennedy (Aug. 20, 1974), reprinted in JOINT
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 368-70. In his letter the President indicated the following:
I could accept a provision with an express presumption that the classification was
proper and with in camera judicial review only after a review of the evidence did not
indicate that the matter had been reasonably classified in the interests of our national
security. Following this review, the court could then disclose the document if it finds




forces and chief formulator of foreign policy. 12 2 Congress dismissed the ad-
ministration's arguments and adopted language'23 that buttressed the role of
the courts in reviewing agency actions to withhold information under any
exemption, although the debate had centered on exemption 1.124 The in
camera examination of documents denied under exemption 1, however, was
discretionary, not mandatory.'
25
Although Congress declined to accept the administration's position on the
scope of judicial review, it attempted to assuage the administration's con-
cerns by inserting modifying language into the conference report that di-
rected judges to give agency arguments considerable weight when classified
documents were at issue. 126 In spite of this conciliatory gesture, President
Ford vetoed the amendments.1 27 Congress decided to accommodate the ad-
ministration's position no further and overrode the veto by a substantial
margin. 12 ' After passage of the 1974 amendments, the intent of Congress
122. Id. ("It must also be clear that this procedure does not usurp my Constitutional re-
sponsibilities as Commander-in-Chief").
123. See 120 CONG. REC. 17,022-32 (1974), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note
11, at 302-38, for a discussion of the Senate amendment that removed the "reasonable basis"
language from the proposed FOIA legislation. The substitute language was incorporated into
the final bill. See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in JOINT
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 226.
124. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1974), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 11, at 225-26. See Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per
curiam), in which the court of appeals described the characteristics of de novo review in the
national security context under the amended FOIA. The court stated that these characteris-
tics applied to exemptions 1 and 3. Id. at 1195. The court outlined the process in this manner:
(1) The government has the burden of establishing an exemption. (2) The court must
make a de novo determination. (3) In doing this, it must first "accord substantial
weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the
disputed record." (4) Whether and how to conduct an in camera examination of the
documents rests in the sound discretion of the court, in national security cases as in
all other cases.
Id. at 1194 (footnotes omitted).
125. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1974), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 11, at 225-26.
126. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 11, at 229. The report stated:
[T]he conferees recognize that the Executive departments responsible for national
defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse effects
might occur as a result of public disclosure of a particular classified record. Accord-
ingly, the conferees expect that Federal courts, in making de novo determinations in
section 552(b)(1) cases . . . will accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit
concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record.
Id.
127. President's Message to Congress Vetoing H.R. 12,471, To Amend the Freedom of
Information Act (Oct. 17, 1974), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 481, 484-
85.
128. The House overrode the veto by a vote of 371-31. 120 CONG. REC. 36,633 (1974),
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seemedclear: the courts were to review more actively an agency's decision
to invoke one of the FOIA's statutory exemptions.
2. The 1976 Amendments
Despite the expressed intent of Congress as reflected in the legislative his-
tory relating to the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, the Supreme Court sub-
sequently deferred to the executive branch's interpretation of a FOIA
exemption in the Robertson case.' 2 9 As originally enacted, exemption 3 pro-
tected matters "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute."' ° The
Robertson Court's view that this language indicated congressional intent to
allow nondisclosure statutes passed before the FOIA to remain in effect was
generally criticized by commentators13 and members of Congress.' 32 Once
again a Court decision on the FOIA prompted legislation that overruled the
Court's position.
13 3
The primary focus of congressional action in 1976, however, was consider-
ation of proposals that eventually became known as the Government in the
Sunshine Act.134 The purpose of this legislation was to publicly open meet-
ings of approximately fifty government agencies, 3 5 and to permit their clo-
reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 431. The Senate overrode the veto by a
vote of 65-27. 120 CONG. REC. 36,882 (1974), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note
11, at 480.
The FOIA amendments were passed in the months following Richard Nixon's resignation in
the wake of the Watergate scandals. The debates took place in light of the public outrage that
accompanied the Watergate revelations, and the enactment of the legislation can be attributed,
at least in part, to the antisecrecy mood prevailing at the time. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC.
34,168 (1974) (statement of Rep. Thompson) ("This legislation ... will be the first major step
forward in helping to restore the confidence of the American people in the institutions of
government by purging the body politic of the secrecy excesses which marked the sordid
Watergate coverup"), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 393-94. See also 120
CONG. REC. 36,867-69 (1974) (containing numerous newspaper editorials commenting on
President Ford's veto of the FOIA amendments in light of the Watergate affair), reprinted in
JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 441-47.
129. See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
131. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at § 5:31; see also Note, supra note 14, at 1036-40.
132. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 24,211 (1976) (statement of Rep. McCloskey), reprinted in
SUNSHINE ACT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 689-90.
133. See S. REP. No. 1178, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1976), reprinted in SUNSHINE ACT
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 807. The Senate conference report stated that "[t]he confer-
ees intend [the amended language of exemption 3] to overrule the decision of the Supreme
Court in Administrator, FAA v. Robertson." Id.
134. See S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975), reprinted in SUNSHINE ACT
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 196.
135. See id. at 2-3 (1975), reprinted in SUNSHINE ACT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at




sure only if the subject matter fell within specific categories that closely
paralleled the FOIA exemptions.1" 6 Congressional sponsors contended that
the Sunshine Act was the logical outgrowth of efforts that began with the
FOIA to make governmental decisionmaking more accessible to the pub-
lic.' 37 Another goal of the legislation was to prohibit ex parte contacts be-
tween government adjudicators and parties interested in the outcome of
particular administrative proceedings. t3 Although it had taken Congress
four years to act on the proposal, t3 9 the Sunshine bill eventually won wide-
spread support and passed both Houses by overwhelming margins.' 4 ° In
contrast to his veto of the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, President Ford
signed the Government in the Sunshine Act. 141
136. See 122 CONG. REC. 28,612 (1976) (statement of Sen. Chiles summarizing the major
provisions of the proposal), reprinted in SUNSHINE ACT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 823-
24.
137. See H.R. REP. No. 880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1976), reprinted in SUNSHINE
ACT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 515. See also S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1975), reprinted in SUNSHINE ACT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 200. The Senate report
described the relationship between the two pieces of legislation in this manner:
The Freedom of Information Act enables the public to review many of the docu-
ments on which government decisions are based. These represent a record of what
has already transpired. Yet up to now the public has not had a full opportunity to
learn how or why government officials make the important policy decisions which
they do. All too often the meetings at which such decisions are made are closed to
the public. . . . By requiring important decisions to be made openly, this bill will
create better public understanding of agency decisions.
Id.
138. See S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975), reprinted in SUNSHINE ACT
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 203.
139. See The Legislative History of the Government in the Sunshine Act-S. 5 (Pub. L. No.
94-409), SUNSHINE ACT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 1-7.
140. The House agreed to the conference report proposal by a vote of 384-0. See 122
CONG. REC. 28,475 (1976), reprinted in SUNSHINE ACT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 820.
The Senate approved the conference report on a voice vote. See 122 CONG. REC. 28,613
(1976), reprinted in SUNSHINE ACT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 826-27. Fallout from the
Watergate affair may have had as significant an impact on the enactment of the Sunshine Act
as it had on passage of the 1974 amendments to the FOIA. See supra note 128. For Water-
gate's impact on consideration of the Sunshine Act, see 121 CONG. REC. 35,331 (1975) (state-
ment of Sen. Weicker), reprinted in SUNSHINE ACT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 347. See
also 122 CONG. REC. 24,197-98 (1976) (statement of Rep. Downey), reprinted in SUNSHINE
ACT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 649-50.
141. See Statement by the President on Signing S. 5 Into Law, 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1333-34 (Sept. 13, 1976). In his statement, President Ford expressed doubts about the
clarity of the amendment to the FOIA exemption 3. He wrote:
The most serious problem concerns the Freedom of Information Act exemption for
withholding information specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute.
While that exemption may well be more inclusive than necessary, the amendment in
this act was the subject of many changes and was adopted without a clear or ade-
quate record of what statutes would be affected and what changes are intended.
Under such circumstances, it can be anticipated that many unintended results will
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The House version of the proposal contained the provision amending the
language of FOIA exemption 3.142 Its intent was to remove from the ex-
emption's protection such discretionary statutes as the one at issue in Rob-
ertson. "' In conference, the Senate agreed to the addition of this section
regarding the FOIA, and it became part of the final bill. 144 In contrast to its
predecessor, 145 the amended exemption 3 permits the withholding of infor-
mation prohibited from release by another statute only if that statute "(A)
requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to
leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld."'
146
The 1974 and 1976 amendments to the FOIA demonstrate that, in the
past, Congress has not hesitated to overturn Supreme Court decisions that it
believed were contrary to the Act's disclosure mandate. 14 7 These legislative
occur including adverse effects on current protections of personal privacy, and fur-
ther corrective legislation will likely be required.
Id. at 1334.
142. See S. REP. No. 1178, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1976), reprinted in SUNSHINE ACT
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 806-07.
143. Id.
144. Id. See also 122 CONG. REC. 28,612 (1976) (statement of Sen. Chiles), reprinted in
SUNSHINE ACT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 825.
145. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
146. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
147. To date there is no indication that Congress intends to act to overturn the Supreme
Court's opinion in Sims. This is in contrast to the congressional reaction to the Court's posi-
tion in Mink and Robertson. See supra notes 112-46 and accompanying text. Legislation has
been introduced in the 99th Congress to amend the FOIA, but none of the proposals relates
directly to the principal issues in Sims. See, e.g., H.R. 1882, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S.
150, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). These bills are concerned with such matters as fees and
waivers, business confidentiality procedures, and the law enforcement exemption of the FOIA.
Both proposals contain provisions that would require agencies to publish a list of statutes
authorizing them to withhold information under exemption 3. See H.R. 1882, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 11 (1985); S. 150, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 17 (1985). See also infra note 210. One
reason Congress may not have reacted to the Sims case is the change in public perceptions.
The amendments to the FOIA enacted in 1974 and 1976 occurred during the post-Watergate
period that included several investigations into intelligence activities. See supra notes 128, 140
and accompanying text. It has been argued that last year's passage of the CIA Information
Act (Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209) reflects a change in congressional attitude toward the
intelligence community. The new statute amended the National Security Act to exempt from
the terms of the FOIA the CIA's "operational files." These were files that never resulted in the
release of any information under the FOIA. Sponsors of the legislation argued successfully
that permitting requests for such material was a waste of resources. H.R. REP. No. 726, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3741.
In return for this exemption, the agency promised to maintain the same level of resources for a
specific period of time in order to reduce its backlog of FOIA cases. H.R. REP. No. 726, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3744.
In spite of these changes, it is clear that in passing this legislation Congress did not intend to
exempt the agency entirely from the FOIA. The House report stated:
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overrulings reaffirm Congress' continuing commitment to a strong public
policy favoring disclosure under the FOIA and to narrow interpretation of
the exemptions. Despite these reversals, however, the Court continues to
construe the exemptions in support of nondisclosure. In CIA v. Sims, the
Court adopted an agency position regarding exemption 3 that emphatically
favors shielding government information from public scrutiny. The Court's
decision in Sims is similar to the approach taken in Mink and Robertson in
its treatment of the FOIA's legislative history and in its deference to agency
interpretations of the Act's exemptions.
II. CIA v. SIMS: A STEP BACK INTO THE SHADOWS
A. The Supreme Court's Decision
In upholding the CIA's decision to deny release of the names of the re-
searchers in the MKULTRA project, the Court first concluded that section
102(d)(3) of the National Security Act was a nondisclosure statute under
exemption 348 The justices parted company over that Act's definition of
"intelligence sources."' 49 Although all justices agreed that the court of ap-
peals' formulation was excessive,"' the majority opinion, written by Chief
Justice Burger, favored granting the agency full discretion on the matter.'51
Justice Marshall, in a concurring opinion, argued for a definition of the term
The Agency's acceptance of the obligation under the FOIA to provide information to
the public not exempted under the FOIA is one of the linchpins of this legislation.
The Act has played a vital part in maintaining the American people's faith in their
government, and particularly in agencies like the CIA that must necessarily operate
in secrecy. In a free society, a national security agency's ability to serve the national
interest depends as much on public confidence that its powers will not be misused as
it does on the confidence of intelligence sources that their relationships with the CIA
will be protected. The Committee nevertheless believes that current FOIA require-
ments create greater burdens and risks for the CIA than is necessary to achieve the
essential goal of preserving full public access to significant information.
H.R. REP. No. 726, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 9 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3747.
148. 105 S. Ct. at 1887. The Court noted that this was the position taken by other federal
courts that had considered the question. Id. at 1887 & n.12.
149. Id. at 1894 & n.2 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
150. 105 S. Ct. at 1890-91. Id. at 1894 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). See supra
note 36.
151. 105 S. Ct. at 1894. The majority concluded:
The national interest sometimes makes it advisable, or even imperative, to disclose
information that may lead to the identity of intelligence sources. And it is the re-
sponsibility of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, not that of the judici-
ary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors in determining whether the
disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising the
Agency's intelligence-gathering process.
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that he believed was in between the extreme views enunciated by the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court's majority. 152 Justice Marshall also argued
that the majority's complete deference to the CIA's position essentially nulli-
fied the review function Congress had outlined for the courts in the FOIA
and had reenforced by subsequent amendments to the Act.
153
1. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority as he did in Robertson, fo-
cused on the "plain meaning"' 54 of section 102(d)(3) of the National Secur-
ity Act and its lean legislative history 155 to conclude that the CIA was given
wide authority to protect all intelligence sources from unauthorized disclo-
sure. 156 He further suggested that the Director had the power to protect the
entire intelligence process, including those areas of subject matter interest to
the agency.' 57 He argued that the hearings held to consider enactment of
152. Id. at 1897 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
153. Id. at 1895-96.
154. Id. at 1887-88. This was the primary argument made by the government in its case
before the Supreme Court. See Brief for the Petitioners at 14-30, CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881
(1985). The government contended that nothing in the legislative history of the National Se-
curity Act
remotely indicates that Congress intended [this section] . .. to be construed nar-
rowly or in a way that would promote the disclosure of intelligence sources to the
public. Nor is there any basis for concluding that Congress was concerned to restrict
the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to withhold information ...
Congress . . .granted the Director . . .unqualified authority to protect the secrecy
of sources.
Id. at 21-22.
155. There is little discussion of § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act in the congres-
sional reports relating to enactment of the statute. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1051, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-3 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1483-85; S. REP. No.
239, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1494.
Neither report makes specific comments regarding the meaning of "intelligence sources."
156. The Chief Justice did not believe that Congress would have intended the judiciary to
be involved in reviewing agency decisions of this kind. He wrote:
The plain meaning of the statutory language, as well as the legislative history of the
National Security Act . . .indicates that Congress vested in the Director of Central
Intelligence very broad authority to protect all sources of intelligence information
from disclosure . ...
The legislative history . . . also makes clear that Congress intended to give the Di-
rector . . . broad power to protect the secrecy and integrity of the intelligence pro-
cess. The reasons are too obvious for enlarged discussion.
105 S. Ct. at 1887-88.
157. Id. at 1892. Judge Bork had made this point in his opinion criticizing the second
court of appeals decision. He argued that § 102(d)(3) also sanctioned the withholding of the
identity of an informant whenever disclosure might reveal subjects that were of interest to the
agency. 709 F.2d at 103 (Bork, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the National Security Act demonstrated that Congress knew the CIA would
obtain intelligence from an extensive variety of sources, without regard to
guarantees of secrecy. 158
The Chief Justice dismissed the court of appeals' reading of "intelligence
sources" as "crabbed."' 5 9 In his estimation, the lower court ignored the
realities of the intelligence field when it stressed that a source could be pro-
tected only if the information that he provided was unobtainable without the
promise of confidentiality.' 60 He articulated concern that sources of infor-
mation would no longer come forward if they believed that their identities
might be revealed in the future. 6' Chief Justice Burger also expressed skep-
ticism about the qualifications of the judges who would be called upon to
consider the disclosure of such information in a FOIA suit.
16 2
In its breadth, the Court's definition of "intelligence sources" was the an-
tithesis of the court of appeals' narrow definition.' 6 3 In the Court's view, an
"intelligence source" was anyone who "provides, or is engaged to provide,
information the Agency needs to fulfill its statutory obligations."' 6 4 In light
of this formulation, which relieved the CIA of a substantial burden of
proof, 165 the Court determined that the research performed by the MKUL-
TRA scientists was required for the agency to meet its intelligence func-
tions.' 66 Thus, the researchers involved in the project were "intelligence
sources," and the agency could properly refuse to disclose their identities in
158. 105 S. Ct. at 1888-90.
159. Id. at 1890. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
160. 105 S. Ct. at 1891-92.
161. Id. at 1891. According to Chief Justice Burger, "[e]ven a small chance that some
court will order disclosure of a source's identity could well impair intelligence gathering and
cause sources to 'close up like a clam.' " Id. Judge Bork expressed similar concerns about the
long-term effects potential disclosure might have on the CIA's ability to acquire important
intelligence information. 709 F.2d at 102 (Bork, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162. 105 S. Ct. at 1891. The Court doubted that judges were capable of weighing the
intricate political and psychological elements involved in deciding when a source would be
injured by revealing the informant's identity. Id. See infra note 205.
163. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; infra note 164 and accompanying text.
164. 105 S. Ct. at 1892.
165. See 105 S. Ct. at 1898-99 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). See also infra note
170.
166. 105 S. Ct. at 1890, 1892. The CIA had argued that the research was undertaken to
ascertain the ability of foreign powers to use drugs in various psychological situations. See
Brief for the Petitioners at 2, CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985). Although the agency
admitted that some of the individuals involved in MKULTRA were unaware of the CIA's
participation, it argued that valuable intelligence information could be obtained from such
sources and contended that their identities should not be automatically revealed. Id. at 3, 39
n.15. Sims argued that because many of the researchers were unaware they were providing
information to the CIA, the agency could not contend that their names should be withheld as
"intelligence sources." Brief for Respondents at 3-5, CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985).
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response to Sim's FOIA request. 67
2. The Concurring Opinion
Despite the relevance of national security to the activities of the CIA, no-
where did the majority opinion discuss exemption 1 as it applied to the facts
of this case.168 Justice Marshall, who concurred in the judgment, pointed
out the importance of exemption 1 in these circumstances. 69 In his view,
the CIA must have made a conscious decision not to utilize the national
security exemption argument in an effort to circumvent the effect of the 1974
amendments to the FOIA, 170 which required de novo review of agency deci-
sions to deny disclosure of documents on grounds of security classifica-
tion. 171 In addition, the amendments gave discretionary authority to review
the documents in camera to determine whether the items were in fact prop-
erly classified. 172 Justice Marshall argued that by ignoring the availability of
exemption I as a means to protect this information and by accepting an
overly broad formulation of "intelligence source," the Court was giving the
CIA Director the type of discretion that Congress was trying to eliminate
when it overturned the Mink decision in 1974.173
167. 105 S. Ct. at 1892.
168. See id. at 1895 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
169. Id. Exemption 1 as amended in 1974 covers matters that are "(A) specifically author-
ized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of na-
tional defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such
Executive order." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983) (emphasis added). At the time
the Sims suit was initiated, Exec. Order No. 12,065 was in effect. 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979). In
1982, President Reagan issued a new order regulating the security classification system. Exec.
Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983). Justice Marshall pointed out that § 1.3(c) of the new
order created a presumption that information relating to "intelligence sources" is to be treated
as confidential. 105 S. Ct. at 1898 n.6 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). He argued that
this presumption removed from the CIA the burden of showing the likely result disclosure
would have on national security. Id.
170. 105 S. Ct. at 1895 & n.3, 1898-99 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
171. Id. at 1895. See also supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
172. 105 S. Ct. at 1898 n.5 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). See also supra notes
123-28 and accompanying text.
173. 105 S. Ct. at 1898 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). According to Justice Mar-
shall, FOIA exemption I was the "keystone" of the congressional effort to balance the needs of
the executive branch with the oversight responsibilities of the Congress and the courts. Id. at
1895. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Marshall relied on the legislative history relating to
the 1974 amendments. See id. at 1895, 1898 & n.5, 1899. He contended that exemption 1 was
also the primary means for the agency to protect intelligence information from unauthorized
disclosure. Id. at 1895. The district court had originally urged the agency to justify nondisclo-
sure on the basis of exemption 1 rather than exemption 3. Id. at 1895 n.3 (citing 479 F. Supp.
at 88). The CIA refused to do so even though the district court had delayed the effective date
of its order to give the agency time to classify the information. Id. The information sought by
Sims was initially classified, but was subsequently declassified by the agency. Id.
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In addition to criticizing the majority for its failure to discuss the rele-
vance of exemption I to the facts of the case, Justice Marshall also chided
the Court for concluding that the "plain meaning" of "intelligence sources"
in section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act supported a sweeping defi-
nition of the term.' 74 He agreed that the court of appeals' formulation was
insufficient and would result in the disclosure of too much material.'
75
Nonetheless, he contended that the majority's approach went too far in the
other direction. 176 Justice Marshall's reading of section 102(d)(3)'s scant
legislative history convinced him that the term "intelligence source" was
ambiguous at best,1 77 and certainly could not be used to sustain the Court's
deferential position regarding the CIA Director's powers under the stat-
ute. 178 In his view, the Court should have adopted a definition of the term
that afforded the courts a greater role in determining whether specific infor-
mation could be withheld under exemption 3. 179 He argued that the crucial
element in deciding whether particular information had been provided by an
"intelligence source" was whether the informant had been promised confi-
dentiality either implicitly or explicitly.'
80
Justice Marshall reasoned that his reading of "intelligence source" was
more in keeping with the spirit of the FOIA than the overly deferential ap-
174. Id. at 1896-97. See supra note 155.
175. 105 S. Ct. at 1894, 1900 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1897. See supra note 155.
178. 105 S. Ct. at 1894. Justice Marshall also pointed out there seemed to be differences of
opinion within the executive branch as to the meaning of "intelligence source." He cited testi-
mony of the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) at a congressional
hearing to the effect that the term was a narrow one. Id. at 1896-97. Established under Exec.
Order No. 12,065 and continued under Exec. Order No. 12,356, ISOO is responsible for moni-
toring the information security program within the entire executive branch. Accordingly, it
could be an important player with respect to an agency's use of FOIA exemption 1 relating to
classified information. See generally ISOO ANN. REP. FY 1984, at 1-3 (1985) (describing the
responsibilities of the Office for the government-wide information security program). In addi-
tion to the FOIA, United States citizens and government agencies may request the review of
classified information through the mandatory declassification program. This program is cur-
rently authorized by Exec. Order No. 12,356, and has been in existence since 1972. See Exec.
Order No. 12,356, § 3.4, 3 C.F.R. 166, 173-74 (1983). See also ISOO ANN. REP. FY 1984, at
11-14 ("Mandatory review is a process popular with researchers as a less combative alternative
to Freedom of Information Act requests."). Unlike denials under the FOIA, agency denials of
declassification requests made under the mandatory review program are not reviewable in the
courts. See ISOO Directive No. 1, § 2001.32(a)(2)(iii), 32 C.F.R. 147, 154 (1985) (providing
only administrative appeals for those denied access under mandatory review).
179. 105 S. Ct. at 1894-95 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
180. Id. at 1897, 1900. Justice Marshall's definition of an "intelligence source" was "one
who contributes information on an implicit understanding or explicit assurance of confidential-
ity, as well as information that could lead to such a source." Id. at 1897.
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proach favored by the majority."8' In fact, he opined that the majority's
position actually frustrated the efforts of Congress to achieve the delicate
balance between the public's need for information and the government's
need for confidentiality in some of its operations. 182 Justice Marshall be-
lieved that in its unquestioning acceptance of the arguments advocated by
the agency, the Court was violating the FOIA's requirement that the judici-
ary review de novo agency claims of exemption.' 83 In addition, he main-
tained that the majority in effect was substituting its own judgment for that
which properly belonged to the legislative branch. 1
84
B. The Majority and Concurring Opinions: Divergent Views of Statutory
Construction and Judicial Review Under the FOIA
1. Statutory Construction
In defining "intelligence sources" and applying the definition to the facts
of the case, the majority attached little weight to the legislative history of the
FOIA and its amendments."8 ' Chief Justice Burger's primary reference to
the Act's legislative history concerned the uncontested' 86 issue of whether
section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act qualified as an exemption 3
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1895-96.
183. Id. at 1894, 1896. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)(B) (1982 & Supp. I 1983), which in part
reads: "[The court shall determine the matter de novo .... " (emphasis added).
184. 105 S. Ct. at 1900 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). One commentator has
recommended that Congress amend the FOIA to clarify the role of the courts in reviewing
CIA claims under exemption 3. Note, FOJA Exemption 3 and the CIA: An Approach to End
the Confusion and Controversy, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1231, 1260-62 (1984). Such an amendment
would provide the courts with a stronger role in reviewing de novo CIA decisions to deny
release of documents requested under the FOIA. See id. at 1261 for the text of the proposed
amendment.
185. Ironically, the only reference to the Mink decision in the majority opinion was used to
support its statement that the Court has consistently held that the FOIA mandates broad
disclosure of government information. 105 S. Ct. at 1886 & n.9. Justice Marshall argued that
the effect of the Sims decision was the opposite of the Act's broad disclosure mandate, i.e., it
removed whole categories of information from release under the FOIA. Id. at 1899 (Marshall,
J., concurring in the result).
Although the majority paid little attention to the legislative history of the FOIA in arriving
at its decision, Justice Marshall examined it in detail in formulating a narrow definition of
"intelligence sources." Id. at 1898 & n.5. He contended that the Court's failure to take into
account the relevance of exemption 1 and its indiscriminatory reliance on the agency's argu-
ments meant that it had neglected to undertake the kind of examination ordinarily required in
cases involving statutory construction. Id. at 1894, 1895 & n.3, 1900. See also infra notes 196-
98 and accompanying text. In crafting the first paragraph of § I1 of his concurring opinion,
Justice Marshall demonstrated the extent to which the Court relied on the government's argu-
ments. Id. at 1896.
186. Although Sims argued against the CIA's interpretation of the meaning and legislative
history of § 102(d)(3), he did not specifically challenge the holding of the court of appeals that
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statute. 187 In fact, those federal courts that previously considered the issue
had come to the conclusion that section 102(d)(3) was a withholding statute
under FOIA exemption 3.188
By relying almost exclusively on the legislative history of section 102(d)(3)
of the National Security Act in making its decision, the majority grounded
its opinion on a legislative record that did not deal specifically with congres-
sional intent regarding the definition of "intelligence sources."'8 9 The pri-
mary focus of the hearings and debates surrounding passage of the National
Security Act was the establishment of a unified military department and the
creation of a centralized intelligence-gathering agency. 9° The legislative
history of the National Security Act does not appear to contain any signifi-
cant discussion of section 102(d)(3). 191
Given this legislative background, it is difficult to accept the Court's posi-
tion that the record is such that "intelligence sources" was understood to
have a single, broad meaning.192 It is just as plausible that in considering the
term, legislators were concerned primarily with a source who might face
"deadly peril" if his identity or assistance to the CIA was revealed. 193 Such
this section of the National Security Act qualified as an exemption 3 statute under the FOIA.
See Brief for Respondents at 14-18, CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985).
187. 105 S. Ct. at 1887 n. 11 (citing the congressional reports concerning the 1974 and 1976
amendments to the FOIA). The Chief Justice also referred to the enactment of the CIA Infor-
mation Act in 1984 to bolster his conclusion that § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act
qualified as an exemption 3 statute. Id. See also supra note 147 for discussion of the CIA
Information Act.
188. 105 S. Ct. at 1887 & n.12.
189. See supra note 155. See also 105 S. Ct. at 1896-97 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
result).
190. See infra note 191.
191. See supra note 155. See also Brief for Respondents at 18-21, CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct.
1881 (1985). Sims argued:
The legislative history of [§ 102(d)(3)] fails to buttress, and even undercuts, the
CIA's expansive construction of... "intelligence sources." The framers of the Na-
tional Security Act. . .were primarily concerned with the coordination and division
of responsibility among the various departments after the national security and na-
tional defense functions were reorganized in the aftermath of World War It . ...
[ ..(Section 102(d)(3)] does not, on its face, require the withholding of any infor-
mation but simply assigns to the CIA (rather than to each individual agency) the task
of protecting "intelligence sources" for all agencies from unauthorized disclosure.
The fact that [it] was written as an organizational rather than information-withhold-
ing statute perhaps explains why its legislative history contains no hint as to what the
term was meant to cover.
Id. at 18-19.
192. See 105 S. Ct. at 1897 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). See also supra note 178
and accompanying text.
193. See 105 S. Ct. at 1897 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). See also Brief for
Respondents at 20, CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985).
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a reading of "intelligence sources" would support a narrower definition that
focuses on the need for confidentiality to protect individuals or institutions
who have aided the CIA.1
94
The majority's preoccupation with congressional intent concerning section
102(d)(3) obscures the fact that Sims filed suit under the FOIA, not the Na-
tional Security Act.'9 5 In determining whether a particular statute sanctions
the withholding of information under FOIA exemption 3, it is important to
ascertain legislative intent regarding that statute. 196 However, such an ex-
amination cannot take place in isolation. The nondisclosure statute, in this
case section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act, must be construed in
light of congressional intent regarding the FOIA in general and the amended
exemption 3 in particular.' 9 7 In Sims, the Court failed to undertake this
kind of analysis.' 98 If the Court had, it might have concluded, as the con-
currence did, that a broad definition of "intelligence sources" would give the
CIA the type of discretion that Congress was attempting to limit by statuto-
rily overruling the Mink and Robertson decisions in 1974 and 1976.199
2. Judicial Review Under the FOIA
Although the Court did not directly address the scope of judicial review
under the Act, the effect of Sims is to limit the ability of the courts to review
matters involving "intelligence sources." The Court's expansive reading of
the term essentially negates the review function Congress prescribed for the
judiciary in the original statute and refined in subsequent amendments to the
Act.
200
194. See 105 S. Ct. at 1897 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
195. See Brief for Respondents at 2, CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985).
196. See id. at 12.
197. See id. at 1-18. See also 105 S. Ct. at 1894-95 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
But see Brief for the Petitioners at 12, 22-24, CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985) (arguing that
it is a "fundamental error" to incorporate the prodisclosure philosophy of the FOIA into an
analysis of § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act and a determination of the meaning of
"intelligence sources"). Id. at 12.
198. Cf 105 S. Ct. at 1895-96, 1900 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
199. Id. at 1894, 1896, 1898.
200. In contrast to the majority's lack of discussion relating to the scope of judicial review
under the FOIA, Justice Marshall emphasized congressional action to expand the role of the
courts. Id. at 1895, 1898 & n.5. In his view, the amendments enacted in 1974 to overrule
Mink were evidence of legislative intent to check agency discretion to invoke the FOIA's statu-
tory exemptions. Id. at 1898 & n.5. These amendments required the courts to review de novo
agency decisions to deny the release of information requested under the Act. Id. at 1894-95,
1898 & n.5. This de novo review included material that involved the national security. In
these instances, the 1974 amendments gave judges the option of examining the disputed docu-
ments in camera. 105 S. Ct. at 1898 & n.5 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). See supra
notes 115, 119-26, and accompanying text. Justice Marshall contended that:
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The Court's implicit view of a limited role for the judiciary in the FOIA
process strongly suggests that its position has not changed in the years since
the Mink decision.2"' This position may be attributable in part to the sensi-
tive nature of the information involved in these cases. Nonetheless, Con-
gress was well aware of the type of information that intelligence and defense
agencies were interested in protecting when it amended exemption 1 and the
judicial review provision of the FOIA in 1974.202 As it implied in Mink,2 °3
the Court in Sims questioned the ability of judges to make disclosure deci-
sions about documents relating to the national security. 2 4 Although Con-
gress had rejected this viewpoint in 1974,205 the Sims majority simply
avoided discussion of such legislative efforts to strengthen the role of the
courts under the FOIA. The result of the Court's decision in Sims is to deny
the judiciary any meaningful role in determining whether the CIA, in a par-
ticular case, has correctly invoked FOIA exemption 3 and properly withheld
material to protect the identity of or information provided by "intelligence
sources."
III. CONCLUSION
In CIA v. Sims, the Supreme Court held that the names of researchers
involved in the MKULTRA project were exempt from release under the
FOIA2 °6 because they were "intelligence sources." 20 7 The Sims opinion re-
flects the generally deferential approach the Court has taken in interpreting
Today's decision enables the Agency to avoid making the showing required under the
carefully crafted balance embodied in Exemption 1 and thereby thwarts Congress'
effort to limit the Agency's discretion. . . . [N]o court may review whether the
source had, or would have been to have had any interest in confidentiality, or
whether disclosure of the information would have any effect on national security. No
court may consider whether the information is properly classified, or whether it fits
the categories of the executive order. By choosing to litigate under Exemption 3, and
by receiving this Court's blessing, the Agency has cleverly evaded all these carefully
imposed congressional requirements.
105 S. Ct. at 1898 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
201. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. Cf Brief for Respondents at 34-35,
CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985) (arguing that the CIA's position in Sims was "nothing less
than an attempt to revive the rule of Mink .... ").
202. See supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
203. 410 U.S. at 73. Cf Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1898 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
204. 105 S. Ct. at 1891. See supra note 151.
205. The legislative history relating to enactment of the 1974 amendments to the FOIA
indicates that Congress repudiated the view that judges were unable to weigh matters involving
the national defense and foreign policy. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 17,023 (1974) (statement of
Sen. Muskie), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 305; 120 CONG. REC. 17,030
(1974) (statement of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in JOINT SOURCE BOOK, supra note 11, at 323-24.
206. 105 S. Ct. at 1892. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
207. 105 S. Ct. at 1892. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
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the FOIA's statutory exemptions. It follows the line of reasoning developed
by the Court in Mink and Robertson.2 o8 Congress enacted amendments to
the FOIA as a result of the latter two cases in an effort to enhance the role of
the courts in the FOIA process. In spite of these changes, the Court in Sims
declined to acknowledge the judiciary's role in determining whether poten-
tially sensitive intelligence information could be disclosed. It bowed to the
agency's discretion in making the final decision regarding the use of exemp-
tion 3 in denying release of the requested information, and ignored the avail-
ability of other options that may have been more appropriate under the
circumstances. 2 9 As a result of this decision, those who voice concern over
increasing government secrecy will again have to turn to Congress if sweep-
ing executive and judicial policies favoring nondisclosure are to be
overturned.21 0
Michael H. Hughes*
208. See supra notes 77-88, 93-108, and accompanying text. But see Department of the Air
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976) in which the Supreme Court narrowly construed the inter-
nal personnel rules and practices exemption (exemption 2) to protect only such matters so
trivial or routine that they could not be "subject to ... a significant public interest." Id. at
369. In contrast to the congressional reaction to the Court's decisions in Mink and Robertson,
the conferees for the Sunshine Act acknowledged the Court's opinion in Rose regarding ex-
emption 2. S. REP. No. 1178, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976), reprinted in SUNSHINE ACT
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 797 ("The House version of the personnel exemption is
agreed to with recognition of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the analogous Freedom of
Information Act exemption in [Rose] .... ").
209. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
210. In fact, the Supreme Court seemed to invite Congress to act if it disagreed with the
Court's holding. Chief Justice Burger wrote: "Congress certainly is capable of drafting legis-
lation that narrows the category of protected sources of information." 105 S. Ct. at 1888 n. 13.
Proposals have been introduced in the 99th Congress to amend the FOIA. One such proposal
was introduced by Rep. Kleczka. 131 CONG. REC. H7474-75 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1985) (state-
ment of Rep. Kleczka). H.R. 3319 or the Freedom of Information Public Improvements Act
of 1985 calls for substantial changes in the FOIA process, including the shifting of oversight
responsibility from the Department of Justice to the Archivist of the United States and the
establishment of penalties for agency delay in complying with the FOIA. It does not, however,
seek to overturn legislatively the Supreme Court's decision in Sims. Similar to other proposals
introduced in the 99th Congress, H.R. 3319 includes a provision that would require each
agency to identify those statutes that authorize the withholding of information under exemp-
tion 3. See H.R. 3319, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See also supra note 147.
* The author is an employee of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO). The
views expressed in this Note are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position
of the ISOO or any other federal agency.
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